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Health care may be similar to Sisyphus work: When the task is about to be completed, work has to start all over
again. To see the analogy, consider an initial decision to allocate more resources to health. The likely consequence
is an increased number of survivors, who will exert additional demand for health care. With more resources
allocated to health, the cycle starts over again. The objective of this paper is to improve on earlier research that
failed to find evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome in industrialized countries. This time, there are signs of such a
cycle, which however seems to have faded away recently.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
When the British National Health Service was created, its founders expected the problem
of ill health to fade away. After all, once people have access to good medical care, they
should live healthy and happy to the end of their lives. History has proven this expectation
to be entirely false. Indeed, decision makers in health policy are haunted by a quite different
suspicion, which Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) dubbed the Sisyphus syndrome. Health care
services could be something like the work of Sisyphus, a Greek hero who was ordered by
the Gods to push a big rock uphill. But just before the very top, the rock would slip from
his hands so he had to start all over again.
Consider the following sequence of events in health care. Initially, politicians decide to
allocate more resources to health. If effective this intervention causes people that would have
otherwise died to survive. With more survivors around, there will be additional demand for
health care services. To the extent that this is financed out of private resources, there is not
too much of a problem. Individuals will adjust their health insurance policies accordingly
and allocate a greater share of their income to health care. However, most of these services
are covered by public health insurance. Rather than accepting to pay themselves, especially
older voters have an incentive to get politicians to reallocate the public budget in favor of
health. The increase in health care expenditure (HCE) again creates survivors. Thus, the
Sisyphus syndrome can go into its next turn.
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For the Sisyphus syndrome to exist, two (possibly lagged) relationships must be
operative.
1. Health care expenditure (HCE) must have the effect of increasing remaining life ex-
pectancy (RLE). For policy, this effect is of particular importance if it occurs at retirement
age because in systems financed by a payroll tax, retired individuals do not contribute to
the financing of health care anymore. In tax-based systems, their contribution decreases
to the extent that their income drops after retirement.
2. Increasing RLE must translate (through a changed planning horizon and through an
increased number of survivors) into an impact on health care spending.
However, the second relationship is confounded in that lower rather than higher RLE is
sometimes associated with HCE. Evidence is accumulating that much of lifetime HCE is
spent during the last year before death (Lubitz and Riley, 1993; Zweifel, Felder and Meier,
1999). In this case, HCE does not generate survivors that will spend more private HCE and
exert pressure for more public HCE in the future. At the macroeconomic level, the share
of the population that is in their last year of life is reflected by the mortality rate. A high
mortality rate (which itself may depend on previous HCE) is associated with high HCE in
the current period while mitigating the dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome.
As to relationship (1), Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found that prior HCE in OECD countries
did increase RLE at ages 40 and 65. But with regard to relationship (2), they were not able to
establish a statistical link between RLE and either public or private HCE. The dampening ef-
fect of mortality was not accounted for. In all, a Sisyphus syndrome could not be said to exist.
The objective of this contribution is to revisit these findings. In the light of improved
specification, data, and econometric methodology, what can be said about the effect of
HCE on RLE, especially at higher ages? Is it still true that no evidence can be found of a
feedback, from increased RLE to HCE? And is it necessary to control for the mortality rate?
Accordingly, the plan of this contribution is as follows. In Section 2, a review of the relevant
literature is provided, followed by a more precise restatement of the Sisyphus syndrome.
Section 3 is devoted to econometric specification, a description of the data base, and variable
definitions. The new empirical evidence is presented in Section 4, while Section 5 contains
a summary and conclusion.
2. Survey of the Literature
2.1. The Production of Health
The seminal article continues to be Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969), who related age-
and sex-adjusted mortality rates of U.S. states to medical care inputs, schooling, income, and
environmental variables. Schooling was negatively related to mortality, medical care inputs
not consistently so, while higher income tended to cause an increase in mortality. Hadley
(1982) refined this approach, using county groups as unit of analysis. Again, education
was negatively related to mortality, income negatively to infant mortality but in mixed
ways to adult mortality. A new finding is that most age-sex specific mortality rates depend
THE SISYPHUS SYNDROME IN HEALTH REVISITED 129
negatively on medical care spending, with an elasticity of −0.15. Focusing on the elderly,
Hadley (1988) found elasticities in the −0.25 to −0.44 range.
An early international study of the production of health is the one by Stewart (1971).
Using the nations of the Western hemisphere in the mid-1960s as the unit of analysis, he
related life expectancy at birth to medical inputs, literacy rates, and the availability of potable
water. All three inputs had small marginal effects in the case of the United States, whereas
literacy and potable water showed significant effects in the less developed countries of the
group.
Cochrane, St. Leger and Moore (1978) based their analysis on a cross-section of 18
developed countries as of 1970. In their correlation analysis, a greater number of physi-
cians goes along with higher rather than lower mortality (with no attempt to control for
reverse causation). Mortality rates correlate negatively with income per capita, suggesting
that the positive effect found by Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969) might be limited
to the United States. They also tested the effects of cigarette and alcohol consumption,
with mixed effects. The ambiguous role of income may be due to failure to account for
unfavorable life styles that accompany the achievement of higher (labor) income. This is
the conclusion that can be drawn from Gerdtham and Ruhm (2004), who find that out of 9
specific causes of mortality in OECD countries, 6 tend to be negatively related to income,
while mortality from heart disease displays a strong and significantly positive relationship.
At the same time, there is evidence in 5 out of 9 cases that a higher degree of demand
pressure in the economy (proxied by a lower unemployment rate) may drive up mortality
rates.
Working with a 1980 cross section of OECD countries, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) in-
troduced lagged HCE (the lag being 10 years due to data availability) as an explanatory
variable on the grounds that earlier medical interventions have assured the survival of in-
dividuals that make up the current population. Also they replaced mortality by remaining
life expectancy (at ages 40 and 65) to better represent the planning situation of forward-
looking individuals. Lagged HCE proved significant, with an elasticity (at the mean)
of 0.15.
More recently Frech III and Miller (1999) review research performed by noneconomists
(focused on low-income countries), which tends to support the notion that literacy and
diet but not medical care resources are determinants of health. They analyze an OECD
cross section, in the main making remaining life expectancy (RLE) at ages 40 and 60 as of
1993 the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include GDP, the consumption of
tobacco and alcohol, and the consumption of animal fats. The authors introduce lags of up
to ten years (depending on data availability) to capture lifetime effects because variations
in most of these variables are unlikely to affect health right away. Rather than considering
total HCE only, they single out pharmaceutical consumption to find that this component
matters far more than does total HCE, which fails to have a significant effect on RLE. In
their analysis of a cross section for the year 2000, Miller and Frech III (2004) complement
their set of explanatory variables with obesity (which proves significant with the expected
sign) but continue to find that pharmaceutical consumption importantly contributes to both
RLE at age 40 and 60, both unadjusted and disability adjusted. Their specification is double
logarithmic throughout, resulting in the estimation of constant elasticities which necessarily
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imply decreasing marginal productivity of HCE as soon as HCE differs more strongly
between countries than does life expectancy (both relative to a benchmark, e.g. the United
States).
Although this review may not be complete, the paucity of studies on the production
of health is striking. By way of contrast, there has been much more research into the
determinants of HCE (to be reviewed in Section 2.2 below). Indeed, one might argue
that the separate estimation of a production function is not necessary, based on a duality
argument. If individuals acted as perfect cost minimizers in their production of health, the
cost function [or an expenditure share function prior to normalization of some price, cf.
e.g. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973)] contains all the information relating to the
production technology. However, the estimation of a separate production function of health
can be justified by the following arguments:
1. Beyond differentiating between medical and broadly economic explanatory variables, it
is still not clear which inputs belong in the health production function and whether their
marginal productivities are stable across countries and across time.1
2. The health production technology is stochastic rather than deterministic. The deploy-
ment of both medical and nonmedical inputs does not always prevent death, i.e. a health
outcome that differs strongly from the one intended. This also implies that cost mini-
mization is possible only on expectation, with large deviations that serve to qualify the
duality argument.
3. In the case of health, prices contained in the cost or expenditure share function are
average prices prior to insurance and public subsidies, while prices governing individual
cost minimization are marginal prices often close to zero and different from average
prices.
4. Cost minimization is not a very credible hypothesis in health since decisions frequently
are made under the influence of physicians. A distortion results to the extent that physi-
cians act as imperfect agents of their patients. Moreover, HCE at the aggregate level may
well reflect political institutions.
Conclusion 1. The estimation of a production function for health apart from a cost or
expenditure (share) function can be justified. The emerging consensus seems to be that at
least some components of health care inputs contribute to health with a lag and decreasing
marginal effect.
2.2. The Health Care Expenditure (HCE) Function
Kleiman (1974) was one of the first to relate HCE to GDP using a cross-section of OECD
country data. He also included the population share of those aged 64+ but was unable to find
a statistically significant effect. Accordingly, Newhouse (1977) focused on the relationship
between per capita GDP and HCE, using a cross-section of OECD countries. The computed
income elasticity indicated that health care is a luxury good. This finding was confirmed by
Maxwell (1981) in a broad international survey.
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In another regression analysis based on OECD data, Leu (1986) reintroduced the share
of persons aged less than 15 years and more than 65 years. However, his main innovation
was the argument that a greater share of public in total HCE facilitates budget maximization
by bureaucrats, which can be restrained by direct democracy or through central control, as
in countries with a National Health Service. These predictions were confirmed but failed to
be replicated by later studies.
In their first attempt at identifying the feedback from remaining life expectancy RLE to
HCE as part of the Sisyphus syndrome, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found RLE at age 65+
to be even negatively related to HCE, although without statistical significance. Public HCE
turned out to be as much of a luxury good as private HCE, with income elasticities far above
unity. In a recent analysis of 70 year old Americans, Lubitz et al. (2003) again fail to find a
relationship between differences in RLE (indicated by the presence of functional limitations)
and projected future HCE. However, as will be argued in 2.3 below, it is sufficient for such
a relationship to hold in a subset of the population in order to fuel the Sisyphus syndrome.
Collating information from three years to form an OECD panel data set for the first time,
Gerdtham et al. (1992) were able to introduce several new explanatory variables, such as
physician density, the share of inpatient to total HCE, as well as dummies for fee-for-service
payment and budgeting caps. In the present context, it is interesting to note that a 10 percent
increase in the share of inhabitants aged 64+ (relative to the 15 to 64 age group) was
estimated to increase HCE by almost 2 percent, in contradistinction to all studies cited so
far.
Extending the period covered to 1970–1991, Gerdtham et al. (1998) introduced a whole
host of additional institutional variables. Among them, public reimbursement, capitation of
physicians, and patient-first payment with later reimbursement consistently are associated
with lower HCE. Tobacco consumption proves to be a significant predictor of higher HCE.
With regard to the share of the elderly population (75+ this time), there is no indication of
a significant effect (negative if anything).
A recent concern has been the possibility of spurious regression results due to nonsta-
tionarity of time series, in particular HCE and GDP. Without directly addressing the non-
stationarity issue, Barros (1998) related the growth of HCE from 1960 to 1990 in OECD
countries to the growth of GDP. The dummy variables representing gatekeeping systems,
public reimbursement, and integrated systems, respectively, all prove insignificant once ini-
tial conditions are controlled for. Implied income elasticities range between 0.62 and 0.92.
In their survey, Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson (2000) report very mixed results of studies applying
tests designed to detect nonstationarity. Since the emphasis of this contribution is not on
the estimation of the income elasticity of HCE, this route is not pursued. Rather detrending
is sought by transforming the dependent variable into the health share in GDP, resulting
in the expenditure share function suggested by duality (normalization by a price should be
avoided in this context, see Section 3). In addition, public debate revolves much more about
the share of GDP claimed by HCE rather than about HCE per se.
Conclusion 2. With one exception [Gerdtham et al. (1992)], there is no evidence to the
effect that a high share of individuals at or in retirement age leads to higher HCE. Other
consistently significant regressors are GDP and likely tobacco consumption.
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2.3. A Combined View: The Sisyphus Syndrome
The theoretical starting point of this study is the fact that an individual not only has to manage
his or her health stock but also a stock of wealth and a stock of human capital (“wisdom”,
see Figure 1). The dynamic optimization problem amounts to a series of portfolio choices
determining the shares held in the guise of wisdom, wealth, and health. Formal modeling has
concentrated on the health and wealth components of this portfolio (see Grossman (2000) for
a comprehensive review). Certainly with regard to the health component, this lifetime asset
management is conditioned by environmental influences (e.g. degree of industrialization,
degree of urbanization). The left-hand portion of Figure 1 thus shows the production part
of the Sisyphus model.
The right-hand side of Figure 1 contains the derived demand part of the model. HCE is
triggered by a gap between desired and actual health stock and influenced by the institutional
characteristics of the health care system and relative prices. This implies that HCE is an
endogenous determinant of health, a fact that has not been duly recognized in those existing
studies on the production of health that introduce contemporaneous HCE as an exogenous
explanatory variable. Next, the input of HCE increases (possibly with a lag) actual health
stock. If actual health stock remains below a critical level, death occurs, and the Sisyphus
cycle comes to an end. If however the stock is sufficient to ensure survival, the individual
concerned can count on performing the cycle for a number of periods. The expected number
of future rounds defines his or her remaining life expectancy (RLE).
Thus, the feedback from HCE to actual health stock determines the number of survivors
who are able to exert demand for health care and hence cause HCE. It is this feedback that
is responsible for what can be called the Sisyphus syndrome: Given that HCE is increased
exogenously (e.g. by an expansion of public health insurance coverage), more individuals
Figure 1. Sisyphus syndrome.
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survive the cycle. Moreover, these individuals have a longer planning horizon thanks to an
increased RLE. This also means that the optimal health stock should have a higher value,
which by itself makes the gap between desired and actual health stock larger, thus calling
for additional HCE again (see dashed arrow in Figure 1). On the other hand, the direct effect
of HCE is to close the gap between desired and actual health stock. Therefore, the net effect
of HCE on the size of this gap remains an open issue, to be examined empirically.
This model motivates the creation of an explanatory variable that has not been introduced
in previous work. It will be called SISYPH because it reflects the potential strength of the
Sisyphus syndrome. SISYPH is the product of two factors: The first is RLE which shows the
number of cycles an individual of a given age expects to perform. However, if the relative
number of such individuals in the population is small, RLE by itself will have a small impact
on the whole system. Therefore, RLE needs to be weighted by the share of the population
at that age as the second factor. Since individuals at retirement age cannot be expected to
contribute much to the financing of future HCE (creating a budgetary problem for policy
makers), the share of those aged 65 and older will be used in the following.
This description of the Sisyphus syndrome is still not complete, however. Some individ-
uals, having exerted demand for HCE on the expectation to survive for at least one more
period, in fact die. Since the gap between desired and actual health stock likely is large
in this event, these individuals will have driven up HCE in the current period while not
contributing to the Sisyphus syndrome in the future. Therefore, this confounding effect
(discussed in Section 1) must be taken into account in order to avoid the risk of overesti-
mating the dynamics of the syndrome. The share of deathbound individuals in a population
is given by the mortality rate, MORT. This constitutes another explanatory variable that has
been disregarded in published work on HCE.
3. Specification, Data Base, and Variables
The theoretical considerations laid out in the preceding section provide guidance as to the
specification of the relationships constituting the Sisyphus syndrome. Ideally, the hypothesis
should be tested using individual panel data; however, data availability dictates the use of
aggregate indicators.
In the present situation, two issues need to be clarified. One is choosing the right lags.
It turned out that if both GDP and HCE have the same lag, multicollinearity becomes
severe. Since the main focus of this paper is on the effect of HCE, GDP is interpreted
as a budget constraint rather than a lifestyle variable in the following, suggesting a zero
lag, while HCE, alcohol consumption, and calorie intake are subjected to different lags.
Preliminary estimates showed tobacco consumption to be insignificant, likely because the
data base contains too many gaps with respect to this variable. The lags tested for are 3, 5,
and 10 years, causing the sample to vary both in terms of countries and years covered due
to missing values. A Hausman (1978) test is applied to select the preferred lag. It must be
admitted of course that any lags exceeding 10 years cannot be discovered in this way.
The other issue is the choice of a random effect vs. fixed effect specification. The ad-
vantage of the random effects specification is that it preserves degrees of freedom; on the
other hand, the country-specific component of the error term has to be independent of the
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explanatory variables for consistency. Fixed effects provide more information about the
peculiarity of a country, but with 30 country-specific dummy variables, multicollinearity
quickly becomes a problem. One solution is to drop insignificant dummy variables, which
however entails a possible type II error each time. The regression strategy adopted here
therefore is to estimate both variants and to decide again on the basis of a Hausman (1978)
test.
In view of the uncertainty surrounding the production of health, a specification permitting
variable marginal effects is retained for the first part of the Sisyphus model. This consists of
equations for remaining life expectancy (RLEF, RLEM) at age 60, the population share of
individuals aged 65 and more (POP65, not available according to gender), and the mortality
rate of the population as a whole (MORT). Subscripts i(countries) and t(year) are dropped for
simplicity except for the error terms and k = 3, 5, 10. In the case of random effects, one has,


RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT

 = α + β1GDP + β2G D P2 + β3 HC E−k + β4 HC E2−k + β5 ALC−k
+ β6 ALC2−k + β7C AL−k + β8C AL2−k + vi + εit (1)
Since these equations have the same explanatory variables, the β1 . . . β8 denote vectors
containing four elements. The same holds true of vi and εit which describe a two-factor
random effects specification, with no correlation across the four equations assumed.
In the fixed effects alternative, the United States serves as a benchmark. The maximum of
29 dummy variables, Di is not attained because of multicollinearity. Interestingly, the same
10 countries had to be deleted from the four equations, yet despite this similarity between
countries excluded, it proved impossible to benefit from the similarity of those retained.
Attempts to group countries with a common dummy variable were not successful. The fixed
effects equation thus is defined as follows,


RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT

 = α + β1GDP + β2G D P2 + β3 HC E−k + β4 HC E2−k + β5 ALC−k
+ β6 ALC2−k + β7C AL−k + β8C AL2−k + γ ′ Di + µit (2)
The variables are defined as follows (see Table 1 for a statistical description) with k =
3, 5, 10,
• RLEF: Remaining life expectancy of females at age 60
• RLEM: Remaining life expectancy of males at age 60
• POP65: Population share of individuals aged 65 and more
• MORT: Mortality rate of the population, both genders, all ages, deceased per 100,000
inhabitants
• HCE/GDP: Share of health care expenditure in GDP, both nominal, in percent
• ALC−k : Alcohol consumption per capita, in litres, lagged k years; ALC2−k : ALC−k
squared
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables, 1970–2000.
Overall 1970 1970 2000 2000
mean mina maxa mina maxa
RLEF 21.973 16.0 20.9 18.2 22.9
RLEM 17.678 14.1 17.8 16 21.4
POP65 13.369 3.1 14.1 5.3b 17.8b
MORT 845.888 852.3 1328.5 670.9b 1173.5b
HCE/GDP 7.571 2.584 6.951 5.412b 12.865b
RPH 89.820 54.8 121.6 98.6 108.1
GDP 15.762 0.272 5.027 2.974 42.315
HCE−10 0.522 0.006 0.144 0.082 2.820
ALC−10 11.018 0.9 23.7 1.4 16.6
CAL−10 3.048 2.096 3.467 1.870 3.705
̂SYSIPHc 272.165
N 233
aThe minima and maxima for 1970 and 2000 were taken over the whole sample
available even if the observation was not used in the estimation of Table 5.
b1999.
cEstimated variable, see equation (3) in the text. Values for 1970 and 2000 not
available due to missing values of either ̂POP65, R̂LEF or ̂RLEM.
• CAL−k : Consumption of kilocalories per capita, lagged k years; CAL2−k : CAL−k
squared
• GDP: GDP per capita, nominal but converted in US$1,000, GDP2: GDP squared
• HCE−k : Total health care expenditure per capita, nominal but converted in US$1,000,
lagged k years; HCE2−k HCE−k squared
• RPH: Price index of health care services relative to price index of GDP
• SISYPH: Predicted RLE, averaged over gender, multiplied by POP65: [for details, see
equation (3)].
The source of all these data is OECD (2001), a source known for several difficulties.
One of them is national differences with regard to the delimitation of the health care sector,
resulting in different baskets of services, another, the lack of comparability and precision
of health care deflators. In view of these difficulties, HCE was not deflated using national
price indexes but by the exchange rate when converting the figures into US$ (avoiding
PPP indicators that may contain additional measurement error; see Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson
(1991)).
The variable SISYPH is constructed using predicted values from equation (1) or equation
(2) as follows,
S ̂ISYPH = (R̂LEF + ̂RLEM)/2 ∗ ̂POP65 (3)
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Finally, the derived demand part of the model is specified as an expenditure share, in
keeping with the duality considerations of Section 2.1. Thus, the core equation for the
health share in the GDP reads as follows with the correct error term added and the dummy
variables if needed according to the model in use,
HCE/GDP = α′ + β ′1GDP + β ′2RPH + β ′3M̂ORT + β ′5 ̂SISYPH + error (4)
Again, no correlation of error terms with those of equations (1) and (2) is admitted. In
contradistinction to equations (1) and (2), these equations do not contain squared terms
anymore to avoid extreme multicollinearity. The variable ̂SISYPH already depends on all
values of squared regressors (see equations (1) and (2)), while for RPH there is no theoretical
reason to enter a squared value when the dependent variable is interpreted as a cost share
equation.
4. Estimation Results
4.1. Production of Health
As stated at the beginning of Section 3, Hausman specification tests were performed to
establish both a preferred error structure and choice of lag. Fixed effects (FE) versus Random
effects (RE) matched with lags of (3, 5, 10) years makes for 6 elements that are pitted against
each other, or 6!(6−2)! = 30 possibilities. This amounts to a total of 15 combinations where
one such combination is to take FE as the maintained hypothesis and to test the RE against
it; the other combination in the pair is to take the RE as the maintained hypothesis and to
proceed conversely.
It turns out that in all of the 15 two-way comparisons, the FE alternative never dominates
without an exception with at least one lag in at least one equation making up (1) or (2).
By way of contrast, the RE specification dominates without exception in three of these
15 paired tests, and in an additional three with no more than one exception. On the other
hand when the Hausman test is applied to the three lags, (3, 5, 10) dominate in (6, 2, 7)
comparisons. Both lags 3 and 10 have five exceptions, but in lag 3, they are multiple in one
case. Therefore, the evidence suggests a random effects specification with a lag of k = 10
years.
4.1.1. The Influence of HCE on Remaining Life Expectancy (RLE) In the original article
by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992), remaining life expectancy of males and females at ages 40 and
65 was distinguished, the main motivation being the quadrupling of observations. However,
the differences between ages 40 and 60 in the present work proved minimal when the critical
values were computed where additional HCE does not affect RLE at the margin. As the
policy focus is on individuals approaching retirement, only gender-specific results for age
60 are shown in Table 2.
Contemporaneous GDP (in US$) is associated with higher RLE in both sexes (with
females possibly affected more strongly), confirming results found by Zweifel and Ferrari
(1992) as well as Frech III and Miller (1999). A decreasing marginal effect of income cannot
THE SISYPHUS SYNDROME IN HEALTH REVISITED 137
Table 2. Remaining life expectancy at age 60, 1970–2000.
Females Males
RLEa Coefficient z P > z Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.122 5.43 0.000 0.077 4.90 0.000
GDP2 −0.002 −3.91 0.000 −0.001 −2.95 0.003
HCE−10 2.045 4.82 0.000 2.022 4.49 0.000
HCE2−10 −0.565 −3.60 0.000 −0.491 −2.95 0.003
ALCL−10 −0.043 −0.70 0.484 0.022 0.23 0.822
ALC2−10 0.002 1.02 0.307 −0.001 −0.22 0.827
CAL−10 0.786 0.65 0.515 −0.723 −1.08 0.281
CAL2−10 −0.083 −0.50 0.614 −0.135 1.53 0.125
constant 18.572 9.11 0.000 16.883 13.94 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 210.64 338.33
Prob > χ2: 0.0000 0.0000
1 − var (εit)
var (RL E F) : 0.601 0.559
N 303 303
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Austria(29), Belgium(22),
Canada(12), Denmark(18), Finland(17), Germany(13), Ireland(15), Japan(2), Luxembourg(4), New
Zealand(19), Norway(29), Portugal(15), Spain(13), Sweden(16), Switzerland(25), United King-
dom(18), U.S.A.(15).
be excluded. The earlier study by Zweifel and Ferrari is also confirmed in that HCE−10
results in higher current RLE for both sexes. Since the squared explanatory variable proves
highly significant, a critical value can be calculated beyond which additional lagged HCE
is counter-productive (flat-of-the curve medicine). Among women, this is approximately
US$1,800, among men, US$2,060, compared to a mean value of US$1,375 in 2000. With
regard to the lifestyle indicators, (lagged) consumption of calories and tobacco do not show
an influence, whereas alcohol consumption benefits RLE at low levels. Similar findings
would have been attained with a lag of 3 rather than 10 years.
4.1.2. Influence of HCE on 65 + Population Share In order to determine the pressure of
individuals faced with a given RLE, their population share must be accounted for, resulting in
the variable SISYPH [defined in equation (3)]. However, the population share of individuals
65 and older might depend on (lagged) HCE.
The results of Table 3 do suggest endogeneity of POP65, but not with regard to HCE−10.
Specifically, higher GDP goes along with a higher share of aged people (up to some
US$28,750), whereas HCE does not have a discernible effect. The first of these two state-
ments holds also for a lag in HCE, CAL and ALC of 3 years; however, HCE−3 would have
attained statistical significance. In the life style domain, alcohol consumption clearly serves
to increase this share, but with decreasing effect at the margin. The remaining lifestyle
variables do not contribute to the determination of POP65, regardless of the choice of lag.
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Table 3. Share of individuals aged 65 and older, 1970–2000.
POP 65a Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.115 6.64 0.000
GDP2 −0.002 −4.67 0.000
HCE−10 0.626 1.35 0.177
HCE2−10 −0.170 −0.97 0.333
ALC−10 0.174 2.75 0.006
ALC2−10 −0.005 −2.89 0.004
CAL−10 −0.274 −1.40 0.161
CAL2−10 0.050 1.80 0.071
constant 11.270 14.15 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 332.63
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1 − var(εit)
var(P O P65) : 0.190
N 394
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Aus-
tria(30), Belgium(30), Canada(30), Denmark(19), Finland(19), France(2),
Germany(14), Ireland(30), Japan(2), Luxembourg(12), Netherlands(2),
New Zealand(20), Norway(30), Portugal(20), Spain(29), Sweden(17),
Switzerland(26), United Kingdom(25), U.S.A.(16)
4.1.3. Influences on Mortality Since mortality is not a core variable of the Sisyphus syn-
drome but mainly serves to take the surge in HCE towards the end of human life into account,
no gender-specific regressions are presented in Table 4. In accordance with early research
on the United States [Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969)], higher contemporaneous GDP
might possibly decrease mortality at the high end of the sample beyond US$35,000; the
same holds for HCE−10, beyond US$1,490, driving home the argument made above that
mortality occurs sooner or later. None of the lifestyle variables are statistically significant.
All of these statements prove robust to a lag of 3 rather than 10 years.
4.2. Explaining the Health Share in the GDP
In keeping with arguments proffered in Section 2.1, the dependent variable here is
HCE/GDP. In the earlier estimation of the Sisyphus syndrome by Zweifel and Ferrari
(1992), an attempt was made to distinguish between private and public HCE to see whether
the feedback from RLE to HCE is particularly marked in the public domain. However, the
published literature does not make this distinction because the assignment of total HCE to
these two components is far from perfect in many countries, resulting in measurement error
(we thank Pedro Pito Barros, Lisbon, for calling our attention to this). With HCE/GDP
being the dependent variable, resulting in a filtering out of common trends, measurement
errors are expected to play a more important role to begin with. Therefore, the distinction
between the private and public components is not made here. All endogenous variables
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Table 4. Influences on mortality, 1970–2000.
MORTa Coefficient z P > z
GDP −8.319 −3.46 0.001
GDP2 0.118 1.84 0.065
HCE−10 −203.305 −5.68 0.000
HCE2−10 68.349 4.02 0.000
ALC−10 −16.843 −1.85 0.065
ALC2−10 0.452 1.78 0.075
CAL−10 86.145 1.32 0.188
CAL2−10 −15.036 −1.78 0.075
constant 1025.007 8.42 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 431.15
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1 − var(εit)
var(MORT) : 0.574
N 351
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Aus-
tralia(19), Austria(30), Belgium(26), Canada(28), Den-
mark(16), Finland(16), Germany(13), Ireland(27), Lux-
embourg(10), New Zealand(19), Norway(28), Portu-
gal(19), Spain(27), Sweden(14), Switzerland(21), United
Kingdom(24), U.S.A.(14)
estimated in Section 4.1 enter with their predicted values, using a lag of 10 years (except
for GDP).
Again, the fixed-effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) specification is based on a
Hausman test. This time, FE dominates. This divergence from the health production part
of the model is puzzling at first sight. However the production of health depends largely
on internationally available medical technology, whereas HCE (as argued at the end of
Section 2.1), is also determined by institutional factors that are not so well presented ex-
clusively by an error component whose autocorrelation coefficient is an average over all
countries. Indeed, Canada and Germany differ comparatively little (some two percentage
points) from the United States (the reference country), Australia, Austria, Portugal and
Switzerland form an intermediate group (around three percentage points), while Luxem-
bourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom are estimated to lie four percentage points below the
United States, ceteris paribus. Other countries cannot be assigned to one of the groups, either
because they fall in between or because they had to be dropped due to multicollinearity (15
cases).
In principle, there could be a problem in particular with the lower bound being zero
for HCEGDP . However, calculations using extreme value combinations of explanatory variables
inducing low predicted values of HCEGDP still produced estimates well within the positive range.
This result is due mainly due to the small effect of GDP on the health share. In spite of
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the political debate on its rise in major industrial countries, no significant effect of GDP
can be discerned. This means that the estimated income elasticity of HCE is 1 (apart from
the Sisyphus effect, see below).2 This is lower than most elasticities in Gerdtham et al.
(1992) but higher than the estimates presented in Gerdtham et al. (1998). As to the role of
relative price RPH, the theoretical prediction would be that both private and public decision
makers tend to substitute health goods for other commodities (aggregated in the GDP) when
RPH is high. The positive coefficient of RPH indicates that the implied price elasticity is
slightly below one.3 Another prediction, already of relevance to the Sisyphus syndrome, is
not confirmed, viz. that a higher mortality rate in a given year means a greater number of
individuals in their last year of life, causing HCE to be high in that year. The coefficient of
M̂ORT is positive but nonsignificant.
Of course, the variable of crucial interest is ̂SISYPH, the remaining life expectancy at age
60 weighted by the share of individuals close to retirement age. It has a highly significant
coefficient, possibly raising the scepter of an aging population that keeps the spiral in motion
indefinitely.
Conclusion 3. The reestimation of the feedback relationship, linking (population share-
weighted) remaining life expectancy to the health share in the GDP, yields preliminary
statistical evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome.
4.3. Assessing the Strength of the Sisyphus Syndrome
The estimates presented in the previous section allow to conclude that there is some pre-
liminary evidence that between 1970 and 2000 a Sisyphus syndrome may have existed.
The open question remains of whether the syndrome may be a phenomenon of sufficient
importance to merit attention for some or all OECD countries. This calls for the evaluation
of the partial derivative ∂HCE/∂HCE−10: If in a given year during the period of obser-
vation, HCE was stepped up, to what extent will later HCE be higher as a consequence
of the syndrome (the lag being 10 years as established through specification tests)? If this
derivative should exceed unity, this would constitute evidence of a locally explosive cycle;
a globally explosive situation can be excluded because all derivatives to be evaluated have
critical values where they become zero (linear and quadratic regressors have opposite signs
in Tables 2 to 4). The identity
HCE ≡ (HCE/GDP) ∗ GDP (5)
may be used to obtain equation (6), establishing the link between HCE/GDP and HCE−10:
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
= ∂((HCE/GDP) ∗ GDP)
∂HCE−10
= ∂(HC E/G D P)
∂HCE−10
∗ GDP + (HCE/GDP) ∗ ∂GDP
∂HCE−10
= ∂(HCE/GDP)
∂HCE−10
∗ GDP (6)
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since ∂GDP/∂HCE−10 can be assumed to be zero. Now HCE−10 influences current HCE
through SISYPH, which is designed to capture the impact of population-weighted RLE on
the demand for health care and hence HCE (see equation (3) again). Implicit differentiation
then yields,
∂(HCE/GDP)
∂HCE−10
= ∂(HCE/GDP)
∂SISYPH
∗ ∂SISYPH
∂HCE−10
= ∂HCE/GDP
∂SI SY P H
1
2
[
∂ RL E F
∂ HC E−10
+ ∂RLEM
∂HCE−10
]
∗ POP65, (7)
since ∂POP65/∂HCE−10 may be set to zero, according to Table 4. Substituting (7) into (6)
and noting that HCE−10 is measured in thousands of US$ and therefore needs to be rescaled,
Table 5. Health share in the GDP, 1970–2000.
HCE/GDP na Coefficient z P > z
Dum Australia 19 −3.057 −7.90 0.000
Dum Austria 26 −3.167 −8.62 0.000
Dum Canada 12 −2.179 −5.35 0.000
Dum Denmark 16 −2.466 −6.26 0.000
Dum Finland 15 −3.238 −8.21 0.000
Dum Germany 11 −1.640 −3.89 0.000
Dum Ireland 15 −2.706 −6.27 0.000
Dum Luxembourg 4 −4.375 −8.45 0.000
Dum New Zealand 16 −3.679 −9.29 0.000
Dum Norway 28 −3.515 −9.64 0.000
Dum Portugal 8 −2.890 −6.33 0.000
Dum Spain 10 −4.001 −8.83 0.000
Dum Switzerland 21 −3.081 −8.14 0.000
Dum UnitedKingdom 17 −3.906 −9.89 0.000
GDP −0.020 −1.13 0.260
RPH 0.012 2.03 0.042
M̂ORT 0.010 1.72 0.085
̂SISYPH 0.069 2.98 0.003
constant −18.092 −1.59 0.112
Wald χ2 (18): 524.26
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1 − var(εit)
var(HCE/GDP) : 0.847
N 232
aNote: that n is the number of country-specific observations, with the
benchmark U.S.A. being in the sample 14 times.
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one obtains,
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
= 1
2︸︷︷︸
∗ ∂(HCE/GDP)
∂SISYPH︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗
[
∂RLEF
∂HCE−10
+ ∂RLEM
∂HCE−10
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗ POP65︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∗ GDP︸︷︷︸ ∗
1
1000︸ ︷︷ ︸
(8)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.069 ∗ [1.46 + 1.51] ∗ 13.60 ∗ 15.76 ∗ 0.001 ≈ 0.021
The derivatives come from Tables 2 and 5 but have to be evaluated at specific values
because the regressors of Table 2 appear not only in linear but also in quadratic form.
Neglecting estimated coefficients that are nonsignificant and inserting overall sample means
one concludes that US$1 of HCE−10 induces some US$0.02 of current HCE due to the
dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome. Assuming exponential decay, one could say that
68 percent of a one-time shock to HCE is carried over to the following year (0.6810 ≈ 0.02).
This is far enough from unity to suggest that the cycle is not explosive.
Conclusion 4. The Sisyphus syndrome seems to have been of some importance during the
observation period, with an estimated 68 percent of one US$ of additional HCE carrying
over to the following year, which points to stability.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This contribution started from the notion that the production of health and the determination
of health care expenditure (HCE) should be analyzed jointly. Short of adopting the duality
argument to the effect that estimating either a production function or an expenditure (share)
function is sufficient, the two links are seen as constituting a dynamic feedback relationship.
Once HCE is stepped up exogenously, it may well (with a lag) increase remaining life
expectancy and hence the planning horizon of an individual considering an investment in
health. This should increase demand for HCE, resulting in a feedback that constitutes the
Sisyphus syndrome. The macroeconomic importance of this syndrome crucially depends
on the remaining life expectancy of those who are at retirement age, beyond which they
contribute little to the financing of HCE. These considerations call for the construction of
the variable ̂SISYPH, which is the remaining life expectancy at age 60 weighted by the
share of individuals aged 65+, the age discrepancy caused by data availability.
From 1970 to 2000 and among OECD countries, there is confirming evidence for both
links. Prior HCE is positively related both to remaining life expectancy at age 60 and the
population share of the aged 65+ and hence the ̂SISYPH variable. In its turn, ̂SISYPH proves
to be a significant determinant of the health share in GDP. An initial HCE increase of US$1
is estimated to still result in US$0.02 a decade later as a result of the Sisyphus syndrome.
Assuming exponential decay, 68 percent of a one-time shock thus are estimated to carry
over to the following year. Since the income elasticity of HCE is estimated to be one ceteris
paribus, much of the observed increase of the health share in the GDP can be traced to the
Sisyphus syndrome.
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However, one might argue that a Sisyphus syndrome does not really exist. For one,
GDP could have been interpreted as a lifestyle variable rather than indicating a budget
constraint. This would have called for the introduction of lags for this variable, which could
have pointed to delayed adjustments of HCEGDP even exceeding the 30 years covered by the
present sample. In addition, in view of the high degree of multicollinearity between HCE
and GDP regardless of the lag selected (simple correlation coefficients always in excess of
0.8538), the estimated effects of lagged HCE on remaining life expectancy likely would have
dropped and possibly could have lost significance. In that event, there would be no evidence
of HCE contributing to the growth of a population segment that has a particular interest
in the increased provision of health care services in a later period. Finally some OECD
countries have missing values more often than others, which may introduce a selection
bias to the extent that those not reporting have less problems with rising HCE (which are
interpreted as a reflection of the Sisyphus syndrome in this paper). The countries more
consistently represented in the sample might therefore introduce a bias in favor of finding
such a syndrome.
While such arguments cannot be rejected out of hand, there are at least two consider-
ations that speak against these. The first is that the hypothesis of a Sisyphus syndrome
as a dynamic relationship puts emphasis on lags. Specifically, in previous research on the
production of health, contemporaneous HCE was not found to consistently lower mortality
rates or increase longevity. However, when introducing a lag of ten years, both Zweifel
and Ferrari (1992) and Frech III and Miller (1999) were able to relate remaining life ex-
pectancy to previous HCE, and this lag is replicated in the present study. Second, the link
between production and factor demand theory suggests use of an expenditure share function
(HCE/GDP) which is much less influenced by a time trend than HCE itself. And it is with
such a detrended dependent variable that ̂SISYPH, whose construction is entirely motivated
by the maintained hypothesis, proves highly significant.
On the whole, the evidence suggests that a Sisyphus syndrome may have been operative
in the OECD countries until the end of the past century. Although its dynamics are far from
explosive, it mirrors the concern of policy makers that the decision to increase health care
expenditure could have some similarity with the proverbial ride on a tiger.
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Notes
1. We owe this important point to one of the referees.
2. The income elasticity of HCE can be calculated as follows. Using HCE ≡ (HCE/GDP) ∗ GDP, one obtains
∂HCE
∂GDP = ∂(HCE/GDP)∂GDP ∗ GDP + HCEGDP . The first derivative equals β ′1 from equation (4); therefore, the elasticity
is given by e(HCE, GDP) = β ′1 ∗ (GDP)2/HCE + 1 = 1 since β ′1 is not significantly different from zero (see
Table 5).
3. Since HCE/GDP is formed using nominal figures, it contains RPH. Noting that RPH = PH/PGDP (the ratio
of the health to the GDP deflator), and using lower case symbols for real quantities, one has (hce/gdp)∗RPH =
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. . . β ′2 ∗ RPH + . . . , or hce ∗ RPH = . . . β ′2 ∗ RPH ∗ gdp. Differentiating with respect to RPH, one obtains,
hce ∗ (1 + η) = β ′2 ∗ gdp, where η is the elasticity of the demand for health care (hce) w.r.t. RPH. Solving for
η, one obtains η = β ′2 ∗ (HCE/GDP)−1 − 1. Evaluated at the sample means, this amounts to −0.99.
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